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ABSTRACT—The racial wealth gap is stunning. The net worth of an average 
White family is nearly ten times greater than that of an African-American 
family. A 2017 Prosperity Now report finds that for African-Americans, 
today’s economy is an extractive one; if existing trends continue, the median 
African-American family will have a net worth of zero by the middle of the 
twenty-first century. This Essay examines these trends in terms of the 
relationship between race, property, and citizenship. American democracy 
has long celebrated economic independence as a desired element of 
citizenship, forging reciprocal bonds between state efforts to promote and 
protect property ownership and property owners’ greater investment in 
community and political stability. African-Americans have long been 
excluded from these benefits and, in the process, have never fully enjoyed 
the benefits of American citizenship that comes with political clout. The 
result creates increased vulnerability, not just to White supremacy, but to 
economic exploitation. The lack of political clout contributes to lax 
regulation and enforcement of lending laws, which allow racially motivated 
predators to act with impunity, undermining the rule of law and perpetuating 
racial subordination. In the modern era, this predation has made home 
ownership, higher education loans, and marriage—the traditional pathways 
into middle-class status—dramatically riskier for African-Americans than 
for Whites. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, property ownership and citizenship have long been 
linked and long served to deny African-Americans full participation in 
American life. The colonies, like Great Britain, limited the right to vote to 
White male property owners. 1  They believed that “[p]roperty supplied 
independence; those without property were presumed to be economically 
dependent on and subservient to others.”2 Through the end of the Civil War, 
however, the vast majority of African-Americans in the United States were 
property,3 and many states limited the ability not only of enslaved people4 
but also of formerly enslaved people to own property within the state.5 Even 
after slavery ended, African-Americans were denied the opportunity to 
 
 1 By the middle of the eighteenth century, all American colonies except South Carolina had adopted 
election laws which denied the franchise to those who owned no property. Robert J. Steinfeld, Property 
and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 STAN. L. REV. 335, 339–40 (1989). 
 2 Richard Briffault, The Contested Right to Vote, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1506, 1509 (2002). 
 3 Roy W. Copeland, The Nomenclature of Enslaved Africans as Real Property or Chattels Personal: 
Legal Fiction, Judicial Interpretation, Legislative Designation, or Was a Slave a Slave by Any Other 
Name, 40 J. BLACK STUD. 946, 946 (2010) (discussing judicial and legislative acts that considered slaves 
as property). In 1790, there were almost 700,000 enslaved African-Americans in the United States, 
constituting eighteen percent of the population. By 1860, there were 4 million enslaved African-
Americans in the South, compared to less than half a million free African-Americans in the country as a 
whole. Aaron O’Neill, Black and Slave Population in the United States 1790–1880, STATISTA (Mar. 19, 
2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/1010169/black-and-slave-population-us-1790-1880 [https://
perma.cc/2QPY-29WR]. 
 4 See, e.g., Lea v. Brown, 56 N.C. (3 Jones Eq.) 141, 141 (1857) (“A bequest of two hundred acres 
of land and three thousand dollars . . . with a provision that on the death or insolvency of the legatee, one 
of the slaves should select an owner . . . is manifestly for the ease and benefit of the slaves and against 
the public policy.”). 
 5 See, e.g., Hinds v. Brazealle, 3 Miss. (2 Howard) 837, 842–44 (1838) (invalidating bequest to 
formerly enslaved African-Americans because they continued to live in the state). Other states that did 
not prohibit property ownership altogether made it difficult for Whites to transfer property to unmarried 
partners and children. Bernie D. Jones, “Righteous Fathers,” “Vulnerable Old Men,” and “Degraded 
Creatures”: Southern Justices on Miscegenation in the Antebellum Will Contest, 40 TULSA L. REV. 699, 
743 (2005) (describing cases that involved informal transfers, bequests, and inter vivos conveyances that 
testators challenged as fraudulent or against public policy because of the unmarried nature of the 
relationships). But see Le Grand v. Darnall, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 664, 670 (1829) (upholding bequest in 
Maryland, a state that did not prohibit transfers to African-Americans). 
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acquire the kind of property that allows for economic security and 
independence.6 This legacy continues to this day—not just as a product of 
the continuing consequences of slavery, but also as a cause and consequence 
of the lack of political clout granted to African-Americans. Even when 
African-Americans have the ability to acquire property and other assets, they 
do not necessarily have the ability to realize the fruits of such investments. 
The result increases American economic inequality more generally, with 
particularly devastating effects on minority communities. 
This Essay examines the continuing role of racial wealth disparities in 
the lack of access to full citizenship. Racial disparities in wealth are 
substantially greater than disparities in income.7 Between 1983 and 2013, the 
accumulated assets of median African-American households decreased by 
75% (Latino households by 50%),8 and a 2017 report found that if present 
trends continue, the median African-American household will have a net 
worth of zero by 2053.9 These patterns contribute to disparities not just in 
economic independence and well-being, but also in families’ abilities to 
manage their investments in human capital (e.g., education) and physical 
capital (e.g., land) that provide pathways for upward mobility.10 The results 
deny racial minorities an ownership stake in American society and make 
their efforts to acquire middle-class status far more perilous than for Whites. 
In Part I, this Essay discusses the close relationship between full 
citizenship and property ownership and how lack of property ownership has 
denied African-Americans standing in the American polity. The historical 
marginalization of African-American communities that began with slavery 
continues today. Part II then examines three factors that have continued to 
reduce overall minority equity across three traditional pathways for upward 
mobility: home ownership, higher education, and marriage. First, the most 
 
 6 See Roy W. Copeland, In the Beginning: Origins of African American Real Property Ownership in 
the United States, 44 J. BLACK STUD. 646, 656–57 (2013) (discussing both de jure and de facto barriers 
to African-American land ownership following Emancipation). 
 7 In 2020, Whites had a net worth of ten times that of African-Americans. Kriston McIntosh, Emily 
Moss, Ryan Nunn & Jay Shambaugh, Examining the Black-White Wealth Gap, BROOKINGS (Feb. 27, 
2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/02/27/examining-the-black-White-wealth-gap 
[https://perma.cc/3RCY-MSM9]. 
 8 DEDRICK ASANTE-MUHAMMAD, CHUCK COLLINS, JOSH HOXIE & EMANUEL NIEVES, PROSPERITY 
NOW, THE ROAD TO ZERO WEALTH: HOW THE RACIAL WEALTH DIVIDE IS HOLLOWING OUT AMERICA’S 
MIDDLE CLASS 8 (2017), https://prosperitynow.org/sites/default/files/PDFs/road_to_zero_wealth.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3893-8MMC]. 
 9 Id. at 12. 
 10 The traditional pathways into middle-class status have been home ownership and other capital 
investments; the acquisition of greater human capital, primarily through higher education; and marriage, 
which combines two family networks to transfer material and emotional assets across generations. See 
infra Part II. 
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dramatic decline in minority wealth stems from the lingering effects of the 
2008 financial crisis where an American housing bubble (fueled at least 
partly by fraud) burst, contributing to a financial crisis. The financial crisis 
was fueled in part by the practices of predatory lenders who deliberately 
targeted minority communities. 11  Second, student loan debt has 
disproportionately burdened African-Americans. At college graduation, 
African-American graduates owe almost 50% more than Whites, and that 
gap more than triples on average over the years immediately following 
graduation. 12  Part of the reason for the gap is that aggressive lending 
practices at for-profit universities are much more likely to victimize African-
Americans than others. Another reason is that African-Americans enjoy less 
of an increase in income than Whites from the acquisition of degrees. Third, 
these disparities increase family instability in ways that undermine marriage 
and increase wariness about a commitment to a partner who may be more of 
a financial liability than an asset in managing a household. 
In each of these cases, intentional public policies—the refusal to rein in 
predatory lending practices, the underfunding of public universities, and the 
encouragement of for-profit universities as an alternative—exacerbate the 
racial disparities. 13  To make matters worse, policymakers pushing free-
market policies have used racial disparities to blame victims.14 Vilification 
of homeowners who borrowed more than they could afford to pay back, for 
example, persuaded the Obama Administration to limit the assistance it 
provided to underwater homeowners—homeowners with mortgages 
exceeding the market value of their homes—even as the Administration 
 
 11 See, e.g., Jacob W. Faber, Racial Dynamics of Subprime Mortgage Lending at the Peak, 23 HOUS. 
POL’Y DEBATE 328, 331 (2013) (describing how lenders increased the availability of credit to “blacks, 
Latinos, and other previously excluded groups, but in the form of higher cost and riskier subprime 
credit”); see generally KEEANGA-YAMAHTTA TAYLOR, RACE FOR PROFIT: HOW BANKS AND THE REAL 
ESTATE INDUSTRY UNDERMINED BLACK HOMEOWNERSHIP (2019) (using the term “predatory inclusion” 
to describe the policies that made African-American homeowners targets for predatory practices). 
 12 JUDITH SCOTT-CLAYTON & JING LI, BROOKINGS INST., BLACK-WHITE DISPARITY IN STUDENT 
LOAN DEBT MORE THAN TRIPLES AFTER GRADUATION 1 (2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research 
/black-White-disparity-in-student-loan-debt-more-than-triples-after-graduation [https://perma.cc/WK64-
JSTP]. 
 13 See infra Part II. The tax system also magnifies the disparities. See generally DOROTHY A. BROWN, 
THE WHITENESS OF WEALTH: HOW THE TAX SYSTEM IMPOVERISHES BLACK AMERICANS—AND HOW 
WE CAN FIX IT (2021) (discussing how the tax system has consistently provided disproportionate 
advantages to Whites). 
 14 andré douglas pond cummings, Racial Coding and the Financial Market Crisis, 2011 UTAH L. 
REV. 141, 147 (2011). See generally JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, LET THEM EAT TWEETS: HOW 
THE RIGHT RULES IN AN AGE OF EXTREME INEQUALITY (2020) (arguing that the political right maintains 
support for unpopular economic policies that allow the concentration of wealth by, among other things, 
stoking racial resentment). 
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bailed out large Wall Street banks and refused to prosecute the bankers 
responsible for these practices.15 
This Essay concludes that the concept of citizenship involves mutually 
reinforcing practices. Achieving the economic independence that comes with 
property ownership and investment enhances the qualities associated with 
responsible citizenship. 16  Yet, real citizenship—including acquisition of 
some significant measure of political clout—also creates the ability to protect 
property investments and make them worthwhile. Truly confronting racial 
inequality, therefore, requires seeing these developments in mutually 
reinforcing terms. 
I. PROPERTY, CITIZENSHIP, AND POLITICAL POWER 
American independence, while celebrated as a triumph for democracy, 
also came with wariness about the precarious nature of democratic 
governance.17 The Founders thought that the prospects for democracy were 
best served by the existence of a large middle group that would promote a 
stable society. 18  They distrusted both concentrated elite power and the 
judgment of the masses who lacked a stake in the stability and prosperity of 
the country.19 In both cases, they feared that unaccountable power would 
corrupt democracy and that a widespread investment stake could align 
political and economic interests in mutually reinforcing ways.20 
In denying the right to vote to the propertyless (and therefore women, 
non-Whites, servants, and those enslaved), colonial leaders expressed 
concern that the powerful, who supplied the economic well-being of the 
dependent, would also command the votes of those dependent on such 
largess, magnifying and entrenching the advantages associated with 
 
 15 See, e.g., David Lawder, Bailout Watchdogs Slam Obama Housing Programs, REUTERS (July 20, 
2010, 10:34 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-bailout-support-idUSTRE66K0I520100721 
[https://perma.cc/NM4V-ES9Q] (explaining how Obama-era housing programs were criticized for 
bailing out banks and failing to prevent home foreclosures efficiently). 
 16 See infra Part I. 
 17 See, e.g., JAMES BRYANT CONANT, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN 
PUBLIC EDUCATION 37 (1962) (emphasizing the importance of education to counter the attractiveness of 
demagogic appeals to the illiterate masses); cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public 
Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 39 (1985) (observing that “the ‘corruption’ that created factions as a natural, 
though undesirable, product of liberty and inequality in human faculties” presents a threat to democracy). 
 18 See, e.g., Steinfeld, supra note 1, at 357–58, 358 n.71 (describing the rationale for limiting the 
franchise to property owners in such terms). 
 19  See, e.g., GANESH SITARAMAN, THE CRISIS OF THE MIDDLE-CLASS CONSTITUTION: WHY 
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY THREATENS OUR REPUBLIC 104 (2017) (describing Madison’s conviction that 
the American democracy depended on the broad distribution of land ownership). 
 20 See supra notes 16–17, infra notes 21–22 and accompanying text. 
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wealth. 21  In accordance with these views, property owners had both a 
measure of autonomy and a lasting identification with the “destiny of the 
country.”22 In contrast, James Madison warned against “the transient, often 
imprudent, and almost always tyrannical nature of an impassioned majority” 
that could give rise to ill-considered factions.23 
The alternative view, often identified with Thomas Jefferson and other 
civic republicans, saw promoting conditions that gave rise to a more robust 
middle group 24  as the solution to unaccountable power threatening 
democracy. The critical factor was not the restriction of the right to vote, but 
the strength of the economic center. Brazilian economist Eduardo Giannetti 
da Fonseca has defined the middle class in modern terms as “people who are 
not resigned to a life of poverty, who are prepared to make sacrifices to create 
a better life for themselves but who have not started with life’s material 
problems solved because they have material assets to make their lives 
easy.”25 Giannetti da Fonseca’s emphasis, paralleling the concerns of the 
Founders, involves a middle group who, on the one hand, are not so wealthy 
that they can rig the system to ensure the success of themselves and their 
children, but, on the other hand, are still capable of producing enough of a 
surplus to invest in the future. 
This conception of a center that was willing to take risks but at the same 
time promote stability resonated with the civic republican views of the 
Founders. At the time of the country’s founding, civic republicans associated 
property ownership, which granted some independence, with an alignment 
of interests between citizens and polity and with the promotion of civic 
virtue.26  Madison and Jefferson, for example, favored relative economic 
 
 21 See Steinfeld, supra note 1, at 340–41; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 
97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1552 (1988). 
 22 Steinfeld, supra note 1, at 358 n.71. 
 23 J. Michael Marshall, Close Encounters of the Referendum Kind, 84 FLA. BAR J. 56, 56–57 (2010) 
(citing THE FEDERALIST NOS. 10, 63 (James Madison)). 
 24 See Letter for the National Gazette (Jan. 23, 1792), in 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 196, 
197–98 (Robert A. Rutland, Thomas A. Mason, Robert J. Brugger, Jeanne K. Sisson & Fredrika J. Teute 
eds., 1983). 
 25  JOHN PARKER, ECONOMIST, BURGEONING BOURGEOISIE: A SPECIAL REPORT ON THE NEW 
MIDDLE CLASSES IN EMERGING MARKETS 1 (2009), https://www.economist.com/sites/default/files/
special-reports-pdfs/13092764.pdf [https://perma.cc/4RZ9-Z5PK]. 
 26 Gregory S. Alexander, Time and Property in the American Republican Legal Culture, 66 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 273, 286 (1991); Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 
331–33 (1996) (noting that the Framers considered property rights highly important in establishing a 
liberal constitutional order). In line with these views, the Founders promoted protection of broadly 
distributed property rights. Alexander, supra, at 291; Claire Priest, Creating an American Property Law: 
Alienability and Its Limits in American History, 120 HARV. L. REV. 385, 387–88 (2006) (noting the 
historical ties between early American views of the importance of broadly based property rights and 
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independence as well as political equality27 and believed that a well-educated 
citizenry would be more resistant to demagogic appeals.28 
The experience of African-Americans in the United States serves as 
counterpoint to every aspect of this account. At the time of the country’s 
founding, the vast majority of African-Americans were enslaved—treated as 
property, denied the right to vote and to own property, and viewed as 
incapable of full citizenship. Those who favored the use of state efforts to 
promote a stable middle class to provide a ballast for American society could 
not have seen African-Americans (who were overwhelmingly enslaved) as 
appropriate candidates for that investment.29 Those who feared the rabble—
a propertyless majority perceived as having little stake in the country—
readily assigned African-Americans to that group. 30  And the legacy of 
slavery left too many African-Americans without property—the 
“ownership” state of the kind that the Founders envisioned was illusory.31 
The historic African-American exclusion from an economically 
independent middle class creates a pincer movement. On the one hand, a 
history of economic predators stripping African-Americans of property 
rights with impunity prevents the accumulation of the physical, social, and 
 
Republican political ideals). But see Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 
1, 5 (1991) (noting that despite the prioritization of property rights, much of early American real property 
was forcibly taken from Native Americans). 
 27 See Letter for the National Gazette, supra note 24, at 197–98. 
 28 See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Washington (Jan. 4, 1786), in CONANT, supra 
note 17, app. III, at 98 (describing Jefferson’s emphasis on the importance of education to a democracy). 
 29 Development economists Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson describe the South, both before 
and after the Civil War, as an “extractive” economy designed to transfer wealth to a relatively small elite 
“plantocracy.” DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF 
POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY 351–57 (2012). In extractive societies, the associated political and 
legal institutions neither protect the property rights of the average person nor constrain elite power. Daron 
Acemoglu, Root Causes: A Historical Approach to Assessing the Role of Institutions in Economic 
Development, 40 FIN. & DEV. 27, 28 (2003). During the early years of Reconstruction, General Sherman’s 
promise to provide formerly enslaved African-Americans with “forty acres and a mule” offered the hope 
of breaking the back of the South’s extractive economic institutions by setting up a propertied class 
independent of the Southern White plantation elite. But once Sherman’s field order was revoked and the 
land returned to the plantation owners, the hope of genuine political and economic transformation—and 
full citizenship for African-Americans—died with it. ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, supra, at 357. 
 30 See, e.g., Willis v. Jolliffe, 32 S.C. Eq. (11 Rich. Eq.) 447, 455–56 (1860) (explaining the likely 
political instability that Emancipation would create); Atwood’s Heirs v. Beck, 21 Ala. 590, 615–16 
(1852) (speculating that an increase in the number of free Blacks in neighboring states might destabilize 
slavery). 
 31 ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, supra note 29, at 357 (“The vicious circle is based on extractive political 
institutions creating extractive economic institutions, which in turn support the extractive political 
institutions, because economic wealth and power buy political power.”); see also Thomas W. Mitchell, 
From Reconstruction to Deconstruction: Undermining Black Landownership, Political Independence, 
and Community Through Partition Sales of Tenancies in Common, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 505, 511–23 
(2001). 
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political capital necessary to assert political power. On the other hand, the 
absence of political power makes it difficult to limit the predatory behavior. 
The inevitable consequence of such a regime is not just the impoverishment 
of African-American communities but their political marginalization. The 
predatory behavior prevents these communities from accumulating surpluses 
that would otherwise allow for investment in the future. Moreover, those 
benefitting from this unjust system view any attempt by African-American 
communities to buck the political or economic status quo as a threat. Thus, 
African-American communities become frozen outside the group that 
matters in the construction of the American polity. 
II. PREDATORS, PROPERTY, AND DISINVESTMENT 
By the middle of the twentieth century, the Civil Rights Movement 
sought to dismantle Jim Crow restrictions and enforce equal rights across the 
board. 32  During the same period, African-Americans strove to become 
members of an economically prosperous middle class.33 As this Essay will 
chronicle, the markers of middle-class status had become investment in 
home ownership,34 education,35 and marriage.36 Each marker corresponds to 
da Fonseca’s notions of middle-class status involving the ability to produce 
enough of a surplus to support investment for the future.37 Striving for each 
of these markers also entailed real risks.38 By the turn of the twenty-first 
century, African-American investors also faced a renewed threat from 
 
 32 ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, supra note 29, at 357. 
 33 See, e.g., Thomas J. Durant, Jr. & Joyce S. Louden, The Black Middle Class in America: Historical 
and Contemporary Perspectives, 47 PHYLON 253, 255–56 (1986) (describing the emergence of a much 
larger and more visible African-American middle class between 1950 and 1980, corresponding to an 
increase in education and movement into white-collar occupations). 
 34 Id. at 261. 
 35 See infra Section II.B. 
 36 See infra Section II.C. 
 37 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 38 Investment involves sinking resources into a capital asset (property ownership, human capital 
investment in education, relationships) with the expectation of a future payoff. See infra Sections II.A–
II.C. This Essay focuses on housing, debt-financed education, and marriage because these three 
investments simultaneously have been viewed as the hallmarks of middle-class status, have been the 
subject of predatory practices that increase household vulnerability, and have triggered “blame-the-
victim” criticism that suggests that the victims are responsible for their own fate. Additionally, although 
stock market investments produce dramatically greater returns than investments in housing and are also 
subject to substantial racial disparities, substantially lower rates of African-American participate in such 
investment than White investors. See, e.g., Philip C. Aka & Chidera Oku, Black Retirement Security in 
the Era of Defined Contribution Plans: Why African Americans Need to Invest More in Stocks to Generate 
the Savings They Need for a Comfortable Retirement, 14 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 169, 173 (2017). 
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predators, particularly predators who targeted the politically marginalized.39 
These predatory behaviors further discouraged African-Americans from 
investing in the three markers of full citizenship and middle-class status. 
Today, these developments threaten the gains that African-Americans made 
during the Civil Rights Era and again threaten the possibility of full 
participation in American life. 
A. Home Ownership 
1. The Ideal 
As a marker of full citizenship and middle-class investment, home 
ownership remains a potent symbol.40 Precisely because property is hard to 
transfer, it constitutes a commitment to the community, the state, and the 
country.41 While property ownership as a precondition for civic participation 
faded with the Industrial Revolution, the idea that some residents who own 
property may have a greater stake in community well-being than others 
remains.42 In this sense, responsible citizenship is still associated with an 
ownership stake in the well-being of society. 
Home ownership has historically been seen as a critical part of the 
“American Dream,” contributing to economic security and civic virtue.43 
Homeowners have been described as financially independent citizens who 
embody the “core American values of individual freedom, personal 
responsibility and self-reliance.”44 Rising home values allow homeowners to 
share in the benefits of economic growth,45 and home ownership—at least if 
 
 39 Many of the practices we describe result from financial deregulation, which has increased the 
opportunities for predatory practices. See William K. Black, The Department of Justice “Chases Mice 
While Lions Roam the Campsite”: Why the Department Has Failed to Prosecute the Elite Frauds that 
Drove the Financial Crisis, 80 UMKC L. REV. 987, 993 (2012); JANIS SARRA & CHERYL L. WADE, 
PREDATORY LENDING AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN DREAM 1–2 (2020). Cf. 
Audrey G. McFarlane, The Properties of Instability: Markets, Predation, Racialized Geography, and 
Property Law, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 855, 859 (2011) (arguing that “the subprime crisis is merely one of a 
long and striking list of episodes of involuntary divestment from ownership of minority property 
owners”). 
 40 See Jared Ruiz Bybee, In Defense of Low-Income Homeownership, 5 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 
107, 138 (2013). 
 41 See id. (contrasting the dangers of absentee ownership with ownership by community residents). 
 42 Indeed, many today continue to see majoritarian preferences as “formed against the backdrop of 
disparities in power and limitations in both opportunities and information.” Sunstein, supra note 21, at 
1544. 
 43 A. Mechele Dickerson, The Myth of Home Ownership and Why Home Ownership Is Not Always a 
Good Thing, 84 IND. L.J. 189, 189–90 (2009). 
 44 Id. at 190 (quoting Press Release, The White House, National Homeownership Month, 2005 (May 
25, 2005), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/05/20050525-14.html 
[https://perma.cc/48SQ-2Q2Y]). 
 45 Id. at 192. 
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the homeowner has significant equity in the property—can provide a 
measure of economic security.46 
For these reasons, the federal government, as it promoted the creation 
of a strong middle class in mid-century America, encouraged home 
ownership through subsidization and other interventions that supported and 
stabilized the housing and mortgage markets.47 Government agencies also 
contributed to the development of the thirty-year fixed mortgage and created 
incentives that increased mortgage lending.48 
2. Race and Reality 
While the government undertook extensive efforts to promote 
homeownership, it almost simultaneously took steps to exclude African-
Americans. In The Color of Law, Richard Rothstein describes the Federal 
Housing Administration’s (FHA’s) efforts to promote segregation.49  The 
FHA pioneered a policy called “redlining,” which refused to insure 
mortgages in and near African-American neighborhoods. 50  It also 
encouraged the creation of racially restrictive covenants and channeled 
greater resources to communities that adopted them.51 While subsidizing the 
creation of entire subdivisions for Whites, it provided little funding for 
African-American neighborhoods and at times mandated that the homes in 
better-off communities not be sold to African-Americans.52 
The exclusion of African-Americans from federal mortgage efforts 
made them more vulnerable to predatory lending practices. In Chicago in 
particular, African-Americans relied heavily on contract lending to purchase 
homes.53 Contract lending differed from conventional mortgage loans in that 
they involved large down payments, monthly payments at high-interest 
 
 46 Id. at 191. 
 47 Id. at 193. 
 48 See Christopher L. Peterson, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Home Mortgage Foreclosure 
Crisis, 10 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 149, 154 (2009). 
 49 RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT 
SEGREGATED AMERICA 63–67 (2017). 
 50 Terry Gross, A ‘Forgotten History’ of How the U.S. Government Segregated America, NPR (May 
3, 2017, 12:47 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/05/03/526655831/a-forgotten-history-of-how-the-u-s-
government-segregated-america [https://perma.cc/JMF2-WNGX]. 
 51  Lisa Rice, Long Before Redlining: Racial Disparities in Homeownership Need Intentional 
Policies, SHELTERFORCE (Feb. 15, 2019), https://shelterforce.org/2019/02/15/long-before-redlining-
racial-disparities-in-homeownership-need-intentional-policies/ [https://perma.cc/LMB7-6KSB]. 
 52 See J. William Callison, From the Reading Room, 26 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 5, 
10 (2017) (reviewing ROTHSTEIN, supra note 49). 
 53 Natalie Moore, Contract Buying Robbed Black Families in Chicago of Billions, NPR (May 30, 
2019), https://www.npr.org/local/309/2019/05/30/728122642/contract-buying-robbed-black-families-in-
chicago-of-billions [https://perma.cc/N4MK-62E5]. 
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rates,54 and title passing to the homeowner only when all the payments had 
been made and all the contract conditions were met.55 The contract seller 
held the deed and could seize the property if the buyer missed even a single 
payment.56 Over the period of the contract, the buyer acquired no equity in 
the home and was not protected by regulation of the practices.57 
A 2019 report examining these practices concluded that between 75% 
and 95% of African-American homeowners in Chicago during the 1950s and 
1960s purchased their homes through these contracts.58 The price markup on 
these homes was 84%, and African-Americans who entered into these 
contracts “paid, on average, an additional $587 (in April 2019 dollars) more 
each month” than if they had a conventional mortgage.59 These practices 
made home ownership much riskier for African-Americans. Speculators 
drained money from African-American communities, and neighborhoods, 
where contract lending predominated, were subject to higher levels of 
decline than other areas. 60  Discriminatory federal policies created the 
conditions that allowed these predatory lending practices to occur, and the 
lack of African-American political clout made it harder to fight the 
discrimination and predation.61 
3. The Financial Crisis, Race, and Disinvestment 
The impact of redlining—and reverse redlining62—in the middle of the 
twentieth century pales in comparison with the impact of the mid-2000s 
housing bubble and the financial crisis that followed. Scholars have 
characterized the financial crisis as “nothing short of the preeminent civil 
rights issue of our time, erasing, as it has, a generation of hard fought wealth 
 
 54 Id. 
 55 David Dayen, African-Americans Are Still Being Victimized by the Mortgage Market, NEW REPUBLIC 
(May 27, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/117912/reparations-how-mortgage-market-hurts-african
-americans [https://perma.cc/8WYR-2YJS]. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Moore, supra note 53. 
 58  THE SAMUEL DUBOIS COOK CTR. ON SOC. EQUITY, DUKE UNIV., THE PLUNDER OF BLACK 
WEALTH IN CHICAGO: NEW FINDINGS ON THE LASTING TOLL OF PREDATORY HOUSING CONTRACTS iii 
(2019), https://socialequity.duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Plunder-of-Black-Wealth-in-Chicago
.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Y5W-ZDKF]; see also BERYL SATTER, FAMILY PROPERTIES: RACE, REAL 
ESTATE, AND THE EXPLOITATION OF BLACK URBAN AMERICA 4 (2009) (estimating the total of African-
American homeowners relying on contract loans at 85%). 
 59 THE SAMUEL DUBOIS COOK CTR. ON SOC. EQUITY, supra note 58, at iii. 
 60 See Sarah L. Swan, Discriminatory Dualism, 54 GA. L. REV. 869, 904 (2020) (observing that such 
neighborhoods quickly declined). 
 61 See id. at 900, 904. 
 62  Reverse redlining has been defined as “the practice of extending credit on unfair terms” to 
communities that have been historically denied access to credit, predominantly on the basis of race. 
Hargraves v. Cap. City Mortg. Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 7, 20 (D.D.C. 2000). 
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accumulation among African Americans.” 63  Between 2007 and 2013, 
African-American college graduates lost an astounding 60% of their 
accumulated equity, and Hispanic college graduates lost an even greater 
amount.64 In comparison, White college graduates lost 16% during the same 
period.65 
The housing bubble and the financial crisis followed a period of 
financial deregulation that fueled predatory lending practices.66 Legislative 
changes in the 1980s and 1990s facilitated a shift from direct lending by 
banks and thrifts to less regulated nonbank lenders through securitized 
lending.67 Banks that made direct loans and held the loans in their own 
portfolios had incentives to secure loan value through underwriting practices 
that appraised long term home value and guarded against the borrower’s 
likelihood of default.68 The revenue of nonbank mortgage originators came 
from “points, fees, origination charges and especially the size of the gap 
between the prevailing interest rate index and the rate paid by borrowers, 
commonly known as the ‘yield spread.’”69 
This meant that the more loans brokers originated, the more money they 
made. And the higher the fees, origination charges, and yield spread 
premium that they could command, the higher their reported revenue.70 
 
 63 Charles L. Nier, III & Maureen R. St. Cyr, A Racial Financial Crisis: Rethinking the Theory of 
Reverse Redlining to Combat Predatory Lending Under the Fair Housing Act, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 941, 
942 (2011). 
 64 William R. Emmons & Lowell R. Ricketts, College Is Not Enough: Higher Education Does Not 
Eliminate Racial and Ethnic Wealth Gaps, 99 FED. RSRV. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 7, 17 (2017), 
https://files.stlouisfed.org/files/htdocs/publications/review/2017-02-15/college-is-not-enough-higher-
education-does-not-eliminate-racial-and-ethnic-wealth-gaps.pdf [https://perma.cc/6SCH-X74E]; see 
also Justin P. Steil, Len Albright, Jacob S. Rugh & Douglas S. Massey, The Social Structure of Mortgage 
Discrimination, 33 HOUS. STUD. 759, 761 (2018) (“Even after controlling for available loan and 
household characteristics, such as income, black home purchase borrowers were more than twice as likely 
to receive a subprime loan as white borrowers and the likelihood of receiving a subprime loan actually 
increased with household income, calling into question claims that subprime loans were given to riskier 
borrowers.”). 
 65 Emmons & Ricketts, supra note 64, at 17 fig.6. Minority college graduates who might have 
qualified for prime loans were targeted for unfavorable mortgage terms, contributing to loan defaults and 
foreclosures that stripped them of the equity they had in their homes before the loans. See Carlos Garriga, 
Lowell R. Ricketts & Don E. Schlagenhauf, The Homeownership Experience of Minorities During the 
Great Recession, 99 FED. RSRV. BANK ST. LOUIS REV 139, 148 (2017), https://files.stlouisfed.org/files/
htdocs/publications/review/2017-02-15/the-homeownership-experience-of-minorities-during-the-great-
recession.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FZT-F6NX] (finding that delinquencies and foreclosures were much 
higher for African-Americans and Latinos than for other groups). 
 66 See WILLIAM K. BLACK, THE BEST WAY TO ROB A BANK IS TO OWN ONE: HOW CORPORATE 
EXECUTIVES AND POLITICIANS LOOTED THE S&L INDUSTRY 30 (updated ed. 2013). 
 67 Jacob S. Rugh & Douglas S. Massey, Racial Segregation and the American Foreclosure Crisis, 
75 AM. SOCIO. REV. 629, 631–32 (2010); Steil et al., supra note 64, at 761. 
 68 Steil et al., supra note 64, at 761. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 768. 
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During the ‘90s, mortgage lenders had developed new models justifying 
increased lending to borrowers with low credit scores. “Subprime loans” 
made to borrowers with greater credit risk tended to come with higher fees 
and interest rates, boosting the revenue for their originators. 71  A lender 
focused on the long-term profitability of a loan portfolio would balance the 
increased revenue from such loans against their increased risk and, indeed, 
the traditional lenders who developed subprime loans reported only slightly 
increased default rates from their portfolios.72 A lender, on the other hand, 
who planned to sell the mortgages to others to be securitized or who simply 
sought to maximize short-term revenue (and the bonuses for top executives) 
would place greater weight on the additional up-front revenue and less on 
long-term risk.73 The least-scrupulous lenders thus sought to grow rapidly, 
emphasizing origination of the mortgages generating the greatest revenue 
and fees, with little attention to loan quality—that is, the value of the 
underlying collateral or the borrower’s ability to repay the loan.74 At the 
height of the housing bubble of the mid-2000s, “the subprime market was 
the Wild West. Over half the mortgage loans were made by independent 
lenders without any federal supervision.”75 
The housing bubble produced a sophisticated “Ponzi scheme.” 76 
Individual brokers who initiated loans “received compensation based on the 
volume of loans originated, rather than the quality of the loans made.”77 The 
emphasis on quantity over quality led lenders to seek out the vulnerable, 
unsophisticated, and politically powerless borrowers who could be 
persuaded to take out loans that industry insiders referred to as “toxic.”78 
The expanding army of loan brokers disproportionately found such 
borrowers in minority communities. 79  Scholars observe, “[a]fter being 
 
 71 See Nier & St. Cyr, supra note 63, at 944–96. 
 72 Id. at 944; see also cummings, supra note 14, at 212 (noting that, for traditional lenders, the default 
rates and percentages are significantly lower than the subprime loans written by independent mortgage 
companies and are in line with typical default percentages expected with CRA subprime loans). 
 73 See Thomas Herndon, Liar’s Loans, Mortgage Fraud, and the Great Recession, 31 REV. POL. 
ECON. 479, 482 (2020). 
 74 Id. at 479. 
 75 Paul Krugman, A Catastrophe Foretold, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/
2007/10/26/opinion/26krugman.html [https://perma.cc/7DDJ-3FG8]. 
 76 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the 
Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 1008 (2009); see also June Carbone, 
Once and Future Financial Crises: How the Hellhound of Wall Street Sniffed out Five Forgotten Factors 
Guaranteed to Produce Fiascos, 80 UMKC L. REV. 1021, 1026 (2012) (describing “the central factor in 
a Ponzi scheme—the ability to earn large sums in the present through activities likely (or even certain) to 
lead to the eventual failure of an enterprise”). 
 77 Carbone, supra note 76, at 1058. 
 78 Id. at 1054–55. 
 79 See Steil et al., supra note 64, at 769. 
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denied credit for years these communities represented an untapped market 
with established home equity and ample room for increased homeownership 
populated by borrowers with little financial experience.” 80  African-
American and Latino borrowers remained “more likely than whites to be 
turned down for a mortgage, even when controlling for income and home 
location.”81 Mortgage originators seeking to peddle nonprime loans on a 
wholesale basis saw an opportunity.82 
Nonprime loans grew dramatically, 83  driven by the mortgage 
originators who often used predatory practices to pressure wary or 
unsophisticated borrowers to take out loans on adverse terms.84 Scholars 
maintain that while predatory lending can be difficult to define, “the link 
between predatory lending and subprime lending is clear”; the lenders 
originating the most nonprime loans also are the most likely to engage in 
abusive lending practices.85 These practices include (1) excessive fees and 
interest rates given the nature of the loan and the borrower’s credit quality; 
(2) “fraudulent, high-pressure, or misleading marketing”; and (3) high rates 
of refinancing, including “flipping” one loan into another, often on onerous 
terms, to avoid default.86 
The results were particularly devastating for minority communities.87 
The mortgage brokers were not trying to provide a service tailored to meet 
borrower needs. Instead, they were seeking to peddle as many high revenue 
loans as possible. 88  The predatory lenders who targeted vulnerable 
communities often focused on well-off minority borrowers—borrowers who 
might otherwise have qualified for more advantageous prime loans.89 As a 
result of these practices, “low-risk African American borrowers were 65% 
more likely than similar white borrowers to receive a subprime home-
 
 80 Id. at 761. 
 81 Nier & St. Cyr, supra note 63, at 947. 
 82 Steil et al., supra note 64, at 761 (attributing the racially segmented practices to the “persistence 
of high levels of racial segregation combined with structural changes in the lending industry”). 
 83 Nier & St. Cyr, supra note 63, at 944. For the purposes of this Essay, we use nonprime lending to 
refer to higher-cost, higher-risk lending products that generate higher revenues for lenders. 
 84 Indeed, loan officers testified that they targeted minority communities because they believed that 
they would be less savvy in evaluating nonprime loans with onerous terms. Steil et al., supra note 64, at 
769. 
 85 Nier & St. Cyr, supra note 63, at 946. 
 86 Id. (quoting DANIEL IMMERGLUCK & MARTI WILES, WOODSTOCK INST., TWO STEPS BACK: THE 
DUAL MORTGAGE MARKET, PREDATORY LENDING, AND THE UNDOING OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 
1, 8 (1999)). 
 87 See Rugh & Massey, supra note 67, at 632. 
 88 Id. at 630. 
 89 See Emma Coleman Jordan, The Hidden Structures of Inequality: The Federal Reserve and a 
Cascade of Failures, 2 U. PA. J.L. & PUB. AFFS. 107, 122 (2017) (explaining how “lenders encouraged 
their mortgage brokers to sell more subprime loans by offering larger commissions” and that this 
contributed to the targeting of minority neighborhoods underserved by more conventional lenders). 
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purchase loan and 124% more likely to receive a subprime refinance loan.”90 
By 2006, “roughly one out of every two loans made to African-American 
(53%) and Latino (46%) borrowers were high-cost, compared to fewer than 
one out of five loans made to white borrowers (18%).”91 
Compounding the effect, roughly two-thirds of the subprime loans at 
the height of the bubble were made to homeowners who already owned their 
homes and were refinancing them, particularly in minority communities.92 
In addition to charging higher fees and interest rates, some of these loans 
offered “temporary low teaser rates, interest only mortgages, or mortgages 
with 40 year payment terms that ballooned in later years.”93 Others involved 
prepayment penalties that made it harder to refinance to avoid the jump in 
monthly payments in later years.94 Yet, the lenders evaluated the borrower’s 
ability to repay the loan based only on their ability to afford the initial “teaser 
rate.”95 
The combination of more expensive terms and the lack of rigorous 
underwriting to determine the borrower’s ability to repay the loan made 
foreclosure more likely. 96  Concentrated foreclosures, in turn, had a 
devastating impact on minority neighborhoods, affecting local property 
values (even in homes that did not experience foreclosure); serving as a 
magnet for crime, particularly when property remained vacant for an 
extended period; and undermining the property tax base needed to support 
local schools and services. 97  Entire communities became burdened with 
increased debt, reducing the assets available for other investments and 
contributing to neighborhood devaluation.98 
Ramirez and Williams conclude that the financial crisis “contributed to 
the greatest upward transfer of wealth in modern American history.”99 In part 
because of falling home values, African-American households experienced 
 
 90 Nier & St. Cyr, supra note 63, at 949. 
 91 Steil et al., supra note 64, at 761. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 766. 
 94 See McGlawn v. Pa. Hum. Rels. Comm’n, 891 A.2d 757, 769 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006) (describing 
onerous lending practices and fraud). 
 95 Steil et al., supra note 64, at 766. 
 96 Nier & St. Cyr, supra note 63, at 948. 
 97 See Nier & St. Cyr, supra note 63, at 948 n.56 (quoting CAL. REINVESTMENT COAL. ET AL., 
PAYING MORE FOR THE AMERICAN DREAM: A MULTI-STATE ANALYSIS OF HIGHER COST HOME 
PURCHASE LENDING 1 (2007)). By 2017, White homeowners at all income levels showed at least some 
appreciation in property while African-Americans at all income levels continued to show home values 
below 2006 levels. Michela Zonta, Racial Disparities in Home Appreciation, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 
(July 15, 2019, 12:01 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2019/07/15/ 
469838/racial-disparities-home-appreciation [https://perma.cc/HC2C-TWB4]. 
 98 Nier & St. Cyr, supra note 63, at 948. 
 99 Steven A. Ramirez & Neil G. Williams, Deracialization and Democracy, 70 CASE W. RSRV. L. 
REV. 81, 99 (2019). 
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a 53% decline in net worth during the financial crisis.100 Hispanic households 
experienced a 66% decline.101 Meanwhile, White household wealth declined 
by only 16%.102 
African-American and Latino homeowners were targeted because they 
were vulnerable.103 Yet in the aftermath of the financial crisis, conservative 
commentators tried to shift the blame to government policies that encouraged 
expansion of lending to previously excluded groups104 or to the borrowers 
themselves for borrowing more than they could afford.105 The purpose of 
many of these efforts was to block regulatory reform and government-
sponsored relief for the homeowners.106  Law professors Janis Sarra and 
Cheryl Wade describe any reforms to help the homeowners as “pathetically 
weak,” and “the actual relief given to families suffering the devastating 
effects of the meltdown [as] woefully inadequate.” 107  The relief to 
homeowners paled in comparison with the Wall Street bailouts that kept the 
major financial institutions that had profited from the practices afloat.108 It 
also undermined the financial base of many minority communities, as 
property values remained depressed and homeowners’ debt burden 
increased.109 The overall result is that the long-standing racial disparities in 
home ownership worsened not only during the financial crisis but in the 
 
 100 Jordan, supra note 89, at 112. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 See, e.g., Swan, supra note 60, at 879–82 (describing the role of redlining and reverse redlining 
in explaining vulnerability during the financial crisis); Hila Keren, Law and Economic Exploitation in an 
Anti-Classification Age, 42 FLA. STATE U.L. REV. 313, 316 (2015) (alterations and emphasis in original) 
(quoting M&T Mortg. Corp. v. White, 736 F. Supp. 2d 538, 576 (2010)) (describing a “jury might well 
conclude that [the borrowers] were targeted not on the basis of being African-American, but because they 
were vulnerable, low-income, unsophisticated, first-time home buyers who happened to be African-
American” even if it cannot be determined that they were targeted because of their race). 
 104 PETER J. WALLISON, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT: WHAT REALLY CAUSED THE WORLD’S WORST 
FINANCIAL CRISIS AND WHY IT COULD HAPPEN AGAIN 218 (2016). 
 105  See, e.g., cummings, supra note 14, at 205 (explaining the “dirty little myth” that minority 
borrowers were to blame for the housing crisis); cf. Christina Parajon Skinner, Misconduct Risk, 
84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1559, 1570 (2016) (observing that the consensus view is that the housing bubble 
was fueled by supply side demand (the desire of the lenders to originate more mortgages) rather than 
greater borrower demand). 
 106 See, e.g., Natalie Goodnow, ‘Hidden in Plain Sight’: A Q&A with Peter Wallison on the 2008 
Financial Crisis and Why It Might Happen Again, AM. ENTER. INST. (Jan. 13, 2015), https://www.aei.org/
economics/hidden-plain-sight-qa-peter-wallison-2008-financial-crisis-might-happen [https://perma.cc/
NZK2-TRTX] (explaining that the result was to get the government out of the housing market entirely). 
 107 SARRA & WADE, supra note 39, at 1–2. 
 108  See, e.g., Jeffrey Manns, Building Better Bailouts: The Case for a Long-Term Investment 
Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1349, 1371 (2011) (stating that Congress authorized bailouts of $700 billion 
for Wall Street through the Trouble Asset Relief Program); see also Emergency Economic Stabilization 
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765. For a comprehensive view, see generally Xiaoxi Liu, 
The Costs of Bailouts in the 2007–08 Financial Crisis, 22 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 417 (2017). 
 109 Nier & St. Cyr, supra note 63, at 948. 
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postrecession recovery.110 African-American college graduates lost the most 
ground as they became even less likely than White college graduates to own 
their own homes than they had been before the Crisis.111 Wade and Serra 
conclude that the “progress of blacks into the middle class that started in the 
mid twentieth century not only stopped after 2008, but also declined 
significantly.”112 
B. Higher Education 
The second traditional pathway into middle-class status and greater 
political clout is education—particularly higher education. Thomas Jefferson 
viewed education much the same way he did property ownership: as 
facilitating the independent thought necessary for democratic self-
government.113 California Supreme Court Justice Goodwin Liu argues that 
education is a central component of the concept of equal citizenship, both 
historically and today.114 Yet, both historically and today, this pathway has 
been more perilous for African-Americans. 
African-Americans were excluded from education during slavery. 
Slave owners believed that education would undermine slavery because “if 
slaves were permitted to learn to read and write the English language, they 
could begin to think and act on their own and rebellion was inevitable.”115 
South Carolina became the first Southern state to pass prohibitions on 
educating enslaved African-Americans in 1740,116 and most of the other 
slave states followed suit.117 With Emancipation, African-Americans slowly 
gained access to public education as the South put in place comprehensive 
public school systems for the first time.118 However, in contrast with the rest 
 
 110  Christopher Famighetti & Darrick Hamilton, The Great Recession, Education, Race, and 
Homeownership, ECON. POL’Y INST. (May 15, 2019, 2:04 PM), https://www.epi.org/blog/the-great-
recession-education-race-and-homeownership [https://perma.cc/LKS9-P42K]. 
 111 Id. 
 112 SARRA & WADE, supra note 39, at xv. 
 113 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Washington, supra note 28, at 98. 
 114 See Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330, 342, 344 
(2006) (“[C]itizenship implicates not only the civic republican values of political participation and 
democratic self-governance, but also the ethical values of mutual respect, personal responsibility, and 
equal dignity.”). 
 115  Monique Langhorne, The African American Community: Circumventing the Compulsory 
Education System, 33 BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASS’N J. 12, 13 (2000). 
 116 Id. 
 117 See Paul Finkelman, Coming to Terms with Dred Scott: A Response to Daniel A. Farber, 39 PEPP. 
L. REV. 49, 67 (2011) (stating that “[m]ost of the slave states made it a crime to educate any blacks, slave 
or free”). 
 118 See STANLEY LIEBERSON, A PIECE OF THE PIE: BLACKS AND WHITE IMMIGRANTS SINCE 1880, at 
134 (1980). 
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of the country, none of the Southern states had well-developed public school 
systems in 1870—for Whites or African-Americans.119 
Meanwhile, by the middle of the twentieth century, university 
education expanded and became more critical to individual advancement. At 
the beginning of this expansion, public colleges and universities were 
relatively affordable.120 But since the end of the 1980s, public funding of 
university education has declined as a percentage of total cost121 as tuition 
has increased substantially. 122  Student borrowing has made up the 
difference.123 
Since Emancipation, African-Americans have sought the same 
educational opportunities as other Americans.124 Yet they have received less 
access to affordable, good-quality education, and pervasive discrimination 
has made the payoff from their investments less than that for Whites with 
comparable degrees. 125  The Great Recession exacerbated all of these 
conditions and set the stage for a new round of predatory practices with 
familiar racially disparate effects. 
Four facts help to contextualize these predatory practices, especially 
during times of financial crises. First, financial downturns are often seen as 
a good time to stay in school and disproportionately affect African-
Americans.126 Second and relatedly, an additional degree can be seen as 
 
 119 See Liu, supra note 114, at 388, 391 (stating that, in the 1880s, the tax base in the Northeast, with 
high school enrollment levels and low illiteracy, was four times the base in “the South, where enrollment 
rates were low and illiteracy rates high”). 
 120 Public institutions and funding reached their height in the postwar era, and the percentage of 
students attending public colleges and universities increased from one in five at the beginning of the 
twentieth century to two in three by the beginning of the twenty-first century. See CLAUDIA GOLDIN & 
LAWRENCE F. KATZ, THE RACE BETWEEN EDUCATION AND TECHNOLOGY 130, 266 (2008). 
 121 See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 120 YEARS OF AMERICAN EDUCATION: 
A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT 71–72, 71 fig.20 (Thomas D. Snyder ed., 1993); Jonathan D. Glater, Student 
Debt and Higher Education Risk, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1561, 1577 (2015). 
 122  John R. Brooks, Income-Driven Repayment and the Public Financing of Higher Education, 
104 GEO. L.J. 229, 239 (2016). The increases have been particularly steep at public universities compared 
with the increase at private, nonprofit institutions. Glater, supra note 121, at 1573. 
 123 Brooks, supra note 122, at 248–51. Brooks reports, “In the 1975–1976 academic year, total federal 
grants were four times the volume of federal loans, but by 1981–1982, loans became a greater share of 
federal funding, and by 2012 the volume of federal grants was about half the volume of federal loans.” 
Id. at 248 (citations omitted). 
 124 See, e.g., Herman N. Johnson Jr., From Status to Agency: Abolishing the “Very Spirit of Slavery,” 
7 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 245, 262 (2017) (observing that “freed Black persons valued education as a 
central tenet of freedom, and this value reflected the desire for autonomy and self-improvement they 
believed to be so indicative of freedom”). 
 125 See Emmons & Ricketts, supra note 64, at 32–33. 
 126 See SCOTT-CLAYTON & LI, supra note 12, at 5 (indicating that higher African-American graduate 
enrollment rates may reflect higher unemployment rates as “the Great Recession hit black college 
graduates much harder than white college graduates,” and evidence indicates that “employers are more 
likely to discriminate against minorities in weak labor markets”). 
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essential to gain employment in a tight labor market. 127  Third, absent 
increased federal expenditures, financial downturns undercut state tax bases, 
undermining support for public education. 128  This can make public 
universities more expensive as they raise tuition to compensate.129 Fourth, 
the decline in income and asset values made it harder for parents to contribute 
to their children’s education, increasing reliance on student loans.130 
During the financial crisis, for-profit universities were poised to take 
advantage of these circumstances to engage in predatory lending practices. 
Their expansion depended on the existence of federal loan guarantees 
without appropriate oversight of the institutions profiting from the loans.131 
In 1965, Congress passed legislation to encourage greater student lending.132 
Student borrowers, who typically have no income, assets, or credit history, 
are thus poor credit risks for traditional loans. 133  By guaranteeing loan 
repayment, the federal government encouraged private lenders to extend 
credit at lower rates.134 In 2005, Congress substantially increased the amount 
students—especially graduate students—could borrow. 135  Congress also 
passed legislation limiting the ability to discharge student loans in 
bankruptcy—a boon to creditors—and expanding the loan programs.136 
As a result, student borrowing dramatically increased, with African-
Americans seeing the largest overall increases.137 Between 1993 and 2008, 
average individual student loan debt rose substantially, tripling for Latinos, 
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quadrupling for Whites, and rising almost sixfold for African-Americans.138 
Graduate borrowing accounted for a significant share of the differences.139 
The most startling finding, however, was that this increased African-
American graduate enrollment was concentrated in for-profit institutions, 
accounting for more than a quarter (28%) of African-American graduate 
enrollment in comparison with only 9% for Whites in 2012.140 
The growth of African-American enrollment in for-profit institutions is 
recent. In 2004, for-profit institutions enrolled less than seven percent of the 
students in any racial group.141 Yet by 2008, around a quarter of African-
American graduates were enrolled in for-profit institutions.142 This growth 
has had a major impact on the student loan picture, particularly for African-
Americans. 
First, the level of borrowing at for-profit institutions is higher than at 
other educational institutions. At all institutions, African-Americans already 
borrow more than other students. 143  At for-profit institutions, students 
generally are more dependent on student loans, with 95% of African-
Americans at these institutions taking out loans.144 
Second, the benefit from attending a for-profit institution is less than 
what students at other institutions receive for their degree. Five years after 
entering these for-profit programs, students are less likely to be employed or 
satisfied with their course of study than students attending public or private 
nonprofit schools.145 
Third, given these factors, it is unsurprising that African-Americans 
have higher default rates than other borrowers146 and that student defaults in 
repaying loans at for-profit institutions are vastly higher than at other 
educational institutions.147 These effects reinforce each other. For example, 
“only 4 percent of white graduates who never attended a for-profit defaulted 
within 12 years of entry, compared to 67 percent of black dropouts who ever 
attended a for-profit.”148 
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Fourth, about a quarter of the racial gap in student loan debt reflects 
differences in rates of repayment and interest accrual, 149  further 
compounding the impact of student debt. African-Americans are much more 
likely than Whites (48% compared with 17%) to have interest accumulate 
faster than repayments, increasing their debt loads after graduation.150 For 
African-Americans, the rates are at “crisis levels” and continuing to rise.151 
While some for-profit institutions perform a useful service by training 
students, for example, in health care and technology,152 others enrich their 
executives at the expense of their students. 153  The growth of for-profit 
education institutions—like the growth of unregulated mortgage lenders—
reflected market-oriented neoliberal ideology.154 As Congress cut back on 
grants, it expanded the availability of federally guaranteed loans and 
seemingly treated the growth of for-profit institutions as evidence of the 
wisdom of the market.155 Yet, increasing the availability of federal student 
loan guarantees without increasing supervision of the quality of educational 
institutions creates what economists call a “moral hazard.”156  Of higher 
education institutions eligible to receive federal financial aid under Title IV 
of the Higher Education Act, 42.9% were for-profit institutions in academic 
year 2016–2017.157 Deriving up to 90% of their revenue from federal aid 
programs,158 these for-profit institutions had incentives to enroll as many 
students as possible.159 With each student enrolled, the college or university 
 
 149 SCOTT-CLAYTON & LI, supra note 12, at 4. 
 150 Id. (“[B]lack graduates owe 6 percent more than they have borrowed, while white graduates owe 
10 percent less than they have borrowed, four years after graduation.”). 
 151 SCOTT-CLAYTON, supra note 146, at 9. 
 152 See, e.g., Deming et al., supra note 145, at 143. 
 153 See Joseph Sipley, For-Profit Education and Federal Funding: Bad Outcomes for Students and 
Taxpayers, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. 267, 274–76, 278–79 (2011) (documenting poor outcomes for students 
and high levels of executive compensation); see also Adam Looney & Constantine Yannelis, A Crisis in 
Student Loans? How Changes in the Characteristics of Borrowers and in the Institutions They Attended 
Contributed to Rising Loan Defaults, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 1, 79–80 (2015), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/LooneyTextFall15BPEA.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
94JS-TCRB]. 
 154 See Black, supra note 39, at 993–95 (explaining that a deregulatory mindset in the lending markets 
led to the financial crisis). 
 155 See, e.g., Jacob Alderdice, The Informed Student-Consumer: Regulating For-Profit Colleges by 
Disclosure, 50 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 215, 224–25 (2015) (observing that “state spending on higher 
education has decreased in the last several decades, falling from 4.1% of total state government spending 
in 1984 to 2.4% in 1994 to 1.8% in 2004,” and that in this period loans have increasingly been preferred 
to direct spending or grants). 
 156 BLACK, supra note 66, at 6 (describing moral hazard as the “temptation to seek gain by engaging 
in abusive, destructive behavior, either fraud or excessive risk taking” and explaining that “[m]oral hazard 
arises when gains and losses are asymmetrical”). 
 157  ALEXANDRA HEGJI, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43159, INSTITUTIONAL ELIGIBILITY FOR 
PARTICIPATION IN TITLE IV STUDENT FINANCIAL AID PROGRAMS 1 (2019). 
 158  Stephanie Riegg Cellini & Claudia Goldin, Does Federal Student Aid Raise Tuition? New 
Evidence on For-Profit Colleges, 6 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y, 174, 175 (2014). 
 159 Sipley, supra note 153, at 291. 
116:120 (2021) Race, Property, and Citizenship 
141 
would receive the federal guaranteed loans up front, ensuring that the 
institution would profit whether or not the student ever repaid the loans and 
whether or not they graduated.160 
The obvious response to this type of asymmetric risk is oversight of the 
institutions. Indeed, the federal government requires accreditation for 
eligibility to participate in the federal guarantee loan program. 161  Yet, 
oversight has been lax,162 and under former Secretary of Education Betsy 
DeVos, the Department of Education has rolled back Obama-era measures 
designed to strengthen oversight.163 
The incentives to grow—and to spend as little as possible educating 
students164—led to the use of aggressive marketing campaigns designed to 
find students who were willing to take out the loans necessary to pay the 
relatively high tuition at these institutions.165 A 2012 Senate investigation, 
for example, found that for-profit institutions spend hundreds of millions of 
dollars a year on marketing, often more than they spend on instruction.166 
For-profit institutions average $400 in advertising per student in comparison 
with public institutions that average $14 per student. 167  The advertising 
typically targets the vulnerable: veterans, single parents, low-income, and 
minority students. 168  The schools have been accused of misrepresenting 
costs,169 using high-pressure sales tactics,170 admitting students who have not 
graduated from high school, and “misleading students about classes and 
programs in order to secure enrollment.” 171  For-profit schools claim, 
however, that they are more likely to meet students “where they are,” 
offering more flexible scheduling to accommodate students who are working 
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or caring for children. 172  Predatory recruiting—including the deliberate 
targeting of prospective African-American students—contributes to the 
racial disparities in enrollment. 173  The lesser emphasis on entering 
credentials and the lesser available support services, not to mention closures 
and outright fraud, contribute to lower completion rates.174 
The responses to the growth in minority student loan debt have been 
twofold. First, just as the financial crisis led to critics questioning the value 
of home ownership, so has the growth in student debt led to renewed 
questioning of the value of a college education. Crippling debt is given as a 
major reason for questioning the value of a college degree,175 and indeed, the 
payoff is lowest for those snookered into attending poor-quality for-profit 
schools. 176  As a result, since 2010, overall African-American college 
enrollment has fallen. 177  The second response has been to increase the 
pressure for across-the-board student debt forgiveness. 178  The critical 
question going forward, student debt forgiveness or not, is what role 
education plays as a pathway into the middle class. 
The COVID-19 pandemic, together with the Trump Administration’s 
weakening of regulatory oversight, has raised the specter of a new wave of 
unnecessary debt.179 Enrollment in for-profit institutions is again on the rise, 
corresponding with substantial drops in community college attendance.180 
Particularly concerning is the increased attendance of first-time college 
students enrolling at for-profit colleges right out of high school.181 Creating 
second-class private institutions to address the unmet need for postsecondary 
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education simply invites fraud—fraud that further undermines the basis for 
full citizenship and strong communities. 
C. Marriage 
Marriage has also been foundational for entering into the middle class 
and marshalling the resources for investment in the next generation. 182 
Extensive commentary addresses the decline in marriage and its 
disproportionate impact on African-Americans.183 What has received less 
commentary is the impact of debt and financial instability on family 
relationships. Financial reserves and family instability almost certainly 
interact, increasing the impact of the predatory lending practices. 
Entering into the right marriage has long been considered necessary to 
assemble the resources required for investment in children. Historian 
Stephanie Coontz maintains that for thousands of years, marriage served as 
a “way of raising capital, constructing political alliances, organizing the 
division of labor by age and gender,” and ordering the relationship between 
children and their parents.184 Marriage served as the principal means “of 
transferring property, occupational status, personal contacts, money, tools, 
livestock and women across generations and kin groups.”185 
Sociologist Orlando Patterson claims that modern marriages continue 
to constitute a form of social dowry that increases the links to richer and 
more powerful parts of society. 186  African-Americans are thus at a 
disadvantage given their lower marriage rates187 and are the least likely to 
marry outside of their immediate ethnic and social group.188 Patterson further 
argues that alternatives to marriage such as cohabitation are even more 
fragile than marriage.189 That in itself diminishes the resources available to 
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the next generation and makes entry into the middle class more difficult.190 
The problem arises not just from the lack of marriage per se, but also from 
the lessened ability to construct the alliances that encourage investment in 
the pathways to middle-class status.191 More recent data indicates that the 
fragility of African-American relationships have only worsened in the 
decades since Patterson wrote.192 
Why African-American family ties are more fragile involves a long and 
complex history. 193  As the preconditions for stable relationships have 
become harder to meet, however, three factors in the modern era undermine 
not just marriage, but also relationship stability outside of marriage. 
The first is the impact of racism on African-American men. In their 
introduction to a 2009 retrospective on the inflammatory 1965 Moynihan 
Report on the African-American family, sociologists Douglas Massey and 
Robert Sampson observe that “Moynihan’s core argument was really rather 
simple: whenever males in any population subgroup lack widespread access 
to reliable jobs, decent earnings, and key forms of socially rewarded status, 
single parenthood will increase, with negative side effects on women and 
children.”194 The inability to secure the pathways into middle-class status 
continues to disproportionately affect African-American men with 
reinforcing effects on African-American family stability.195 
The second is the “mismatch” between African-American men and 
women. Sociologists maintain that in societies where women outnumber 
men, marriage declines and women invest more in their own resources, 
networks, and earning capacity. 196  Among African-Americans, gender 
disparities increase over time, as African-American male death rates outpace 
those of the women.197 The high incarceration rates of African-American 
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males exacerbate the ratios further. 198  Educational differences further 
separate African-American men and women. A 2007 report found that only 
46% of African-American boys graduated from high school in comparison 
with 60% of girls.199 The disparities in college graduation rates are even 
greater, with twice as many African-American women as men graduating 
from college. 200  In some African-American communities, marriageable 
women outnumber marriageable men by two-to-one.201 
The third and final factor is gender distrust. As intimate relationships 
have become more egalitarian, they depend to a greater degree on shared 
expectations about committed relationships.202 Yet, when women outnumber 
men in a given marriage market, that trust tends to decline.203 And when men 
and women in a given culture have different expectations about intimate 
relationships, the foundation for long-term commitment is harder to 
establish.204 Differences in the sex-role ideologies of African-American men 
and women tend to be larger than for other groups.205 
These three factors result in patterns of family formation in African-
American communities different from White communities. In 2018, for 
example, 39.6% of births in the United States were nonmarital, with African-
Americans (69.4%), Native Americans (68.2%), and Hispanics (51.8%) 
having the highest rates.206  Moreover, births to “solo” mothers, who are 
neither married nor cohabitating, constitute almost half of African-American 
births, in contrast with 9% of births to Whites and 16% of births to Latinas.207 
And African-American marriages are substantially more likely than White 
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marriages to end in divorce in most age groups.208 Moreover, for African-
Americans, higher levels of education and income have less of a protective 
effect. African-American women with bachelor’s degrees are less likely to 
marry and stay married than other college graduates.209 
The interaction between family structure and economic vulnerability 
increases the importance of a financial cushion before marriage.210 Marriage 
itself tends to be associated with higher levels of these resources whether 
from savings, homeownership, or parental contributions.211 Those without 
such safety nets have a harder time recovering financially from illnesses, 
unemployment, and unexpected expenses.212 In today’s marriage markets, 
therefore, it is not surprising that “both women’s and men’s earnings are 
positively associated with marriage and that the positive association between 
women’s earnings and marriage has been increasing over time.”213 
In the absence of such reserves, commitment to a partner who may need 
support is a risky proposition. Many individuals are reluctant to commit to a 
partner who is not financially stable for fear that the relationship will deplete 
their own resources.214 Economic insecurity accordingly increases family 
instability. For example, going through a foreclosure makes it more likely 
that a married couple will divorce.215 The same goes for student loan debt. 
One study found that “13% of divorcees blame student loans specifically 
for ending their marriage,” and a larger number suggested that such debt 
contributed to tensions.216 
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All these factors disproportionately affect African-Americans.217 They 
also increase the attractiveness of student loans, at least from the perspective 
of African-American women. African-American women, who are more 
likely than White women to believe that they will need to rely on their own 
resources, see additional education as critical to their advancement in 
employment.218 Yet, as shown above, increased debt may further undermine 
and destabilize relationship commitment. 
Together, these trends magnify the racial wealth gap.219 For African-
Americans, the lack of access to marriage has compounded social, economic, 
and political marginalization. And the lack of a greater financial cushion 
undermines marriage. 
CONCLUSION 
As the United States has dismantled the protections that fueled stable 
prosperity in the middle of the twentieth century, the pathways into the 
middle class have become more perilous. Those perils have become 
particularly treacherous for African-Americans. Home ownership, higher 
education, and marriage remain important sources of full citizenship, 
political clout, and advancement for most; yet, the security that such 
investments traditionally provided has become harder to achieve. This has 
occurred in part because the nature of the American political system has 
changed with the country’s changing demographics, including greater 
inequality and greater diversity. Instead of shared prosperity, Americans are 
experiencing increasing inequality. These changes came to a head in the 
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. While Whites have largely recovered, 
the financial crisis destroyed a stunning percentage of African-American 
wealth, which remains unrecovered due to a dramatically slower recovery in 
both housing values and income potential relative to White communities. 
The result undermines political as well as economic equality, threatening the 
prosperity of what has been the most upwardly mobile parts of minority 
communities and discouraging future investment. 
 
 217 See notes 7–8 (documenting the dramatically lower wealth of African-Americans); Section II.B 
(describing crisis levels of student loan debt for African-Americans). 
 218  See, e.g., Stéphane Mechoulan, The External Effects of Black Male Incarceration on Black 
Females, 29 J. LAB. ECON. 1, 27 (2011) (describing how mass incarceration policies that affect African-
American men correlate with increased emphasis on African-American female employment). 
 219  See WILLIAM R. EMMONS & BRYAN J. NOETH, FED. RSRV. BANK ST. LOUIS, WHY DIDN’T 
HIGHER EDUCATION PROTECT HISPANIC AND BLACK WEALTH? 1 tbl.2 (2015), 
https://www.stlouisfed.org/~/media/Publications/In-the-Balance/Images/Issue_12/ITB_August 
_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/YAY8-88LY] (observing that African-American college graduates have an 
average net worth one-tenth that of White college graduates). 
